Military Logistics and Strategic Performance by Thomas M. Kane

Author:Thomas M. Kane [Kane, Thomas M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9781136602337
Google: 6EtTZGssoa4C
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2012-07-26T16:14:18+00:00

MOBILISATION IN THE SHADOWS

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was only part of the Communist logistical system. PLF and PAVN forces obtained over three-quarters of their logistical support from the civilians of South Vietnam.114 COSVN established a well-organised system of taxation, commerce, forced labour, local transportation networks and clandestine industries to provide for the needs of Communist fighters.115 The southern logistical organisations not only increased the total volume of supplies which VC/NVA troops had available to them, they made it possible for Communist units to fight on at times when Allied forces had disrupted their usual lines of communication. Therefore, Communist commanders could count on reliable and relatively abundant support under a wide variety of combat conditions.

In regions where the VC and NVA had influence, the Communists integrated the entire population into their logistical system. Communist commanders conscripted peasants as unpaid labourers in whatever numbers they desired, whenever it suited their purposes. In emergencies, the guerrillas were known to impress thousands of people at a time to build fortifications and dig tunnel networks.116 At other times, the Communists exacted their labour tribute in a more regular fashion. In Binh Ba village, for instance, VC cadres imposed the following regime:

Everyone in the village had to do three months’ labour a year. All young men had to do labour in battlefields, carrying wounded and ammunition; 7–20 day missions. Men under 45 and single females transported rice and goods, but not in battle. Men over 45 worked on the destruction of roads.117

Civilians dug graves and carried dead soldiers from the battlefield.118 This service had great psychological importance to the Vietnamese, who, like people from most parts of the world, attach great cultural significance to the treatment of the dead. Indeed, NLF commanders feared that the peasants would turn against them in general revulsion if they failed to give their fallen soldiers proper funerals.119 Furthermore, by removing casualties from the battlefield, the VC made it difficult for Allied intelligence officers to assess the results of an engagement.

South Vietnamese civilians manufactured clothing for NLF and PAVN soldiers. The typical VC division had 20 to 30 sewing machines, which it distributed among peasant families.120 Communist regulations required these families to produce four uniforms per day, although actual output averaged about two and a half.121 The NLF and PAVN paid these peasants from 2 to 35 piastres for each suit of clothes.122

As for other equipment, a VC organisation known as Rear Services Group 83 maintained a network of agents and front companies which could buy almost anything but weapons and ammunition from civilian markets.123 Table 1 shows the goods that Group 83 procured from commercial sources between October 1965 and April 1966.

The VC participated in the black market as well, and established control over it wherever possible. Criminal rings in the Saigon area manufactured false identification papers for Communist operatives.124 In Tay Ninh province, near Cambodia, the VC organised a daily bazaar at which over 300 black-marketeers at a time would gather to sell a wide variety of goods for inflated prices.

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